Towards a Metasemantic Theory of De Se Content

Towards a Metasemantic Theory of De Se Content

This paper aims at providing the bricks for raising such a building. In particular, after arguing that the content of conscious states is de se the correctness conditions of conscious states concern the subject that is undergoing the experience as such I want to present the very basics for naturalizing their content. This would make it possible to appeal to conscious states in order to explain, in a naturalistic compatible way, the self-ascription of properties.

This paper was presented at the II TALLER EN FILOSOFÍA DE LA BIOLOGÍA Y DE LAS CIENCIAS COGNITIVAS at the UNED. Here are the slides of the presentation (in spanish)

Advertisements
This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s