Foundations for a Metasemantic Theory of De Se Content

New Draft: January 15th, 2013

Attitudes de se present a problem for traditional theories of mental content because the way the world might be seems not to be enough for determining its correctness conditions. One possible solution is to maintain that the content of de se attitudes involves a self-attribution of properties. The aim of this paper is to offer a naturalistic understanding of the relation of self-representation, which makes it possible to ground a metasemantic theory of de se content.

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