How Experiences Should be Individuated: A Defense of Contrastive Individuation

How Experiences Should be Individuated: a Defense of Contrastive Individuation

The non-transitivity of the relation looking the same as has been used to argue that the relation same phenomenal character as is non-transitive; a result that might jeopardize certain theories of consciousness. In this paper I will argue against this conclusion, granting the premise, by defending a contrastive criterion for individuation
of phenomenal characters.This criterion forces one to dissociate lookings and phenomenology, what some might find counterintuitive. However, this intuition is left unsupported once one distinguishes phenomenology and cognitive access; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

Advertisements
This entry was posted in Uncategorized. Bookmark the permalink.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s