How Experiences Should be Individuated: A Defense of Contrastive Individuation

How Experiences Should be Individuated: a Defense of Contrastive Individuation

The non-transitivity of the relation looking the same as has been used to argue that the relation same phenomenal character as is non-transitive; a result that might jeopardize certain theories of consciousness. In this paper I will argue against this conclusion, granting the premise, by defending a contrastive criterion for individuation
of phenomenal characters.This criterion forces one to dissociate lookings and phenomenology, what some might find counterintuitive. However, this intuition is left unsupported once one distinguishes phenomenology and cognitive access; a distinction that is conceptually and empirically grounded.

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Self-Involving Representationalism: In favor of a Weak Interpretation of Hume’s Observation

Self-Involving Representationalism: In favor of Hume’s Observation 

One of the most famous Hume’s quotes regards the relation between perception
and oneself:

Hume’s Observation: I never can catch myself at any time without a perception,
and never can observe any thing but the perception. Hume (1739, p.252)

Most people tend to agree with Hume’s observation, but disagree on the metaphysical
conclusions to be derived from it: do selves exist? Are selves mere
bundles of perception? Do they in endure? In this paper I am not interested
in these metaphysical questions but rather in phenomenological considerations;
and in particular whether there is such a thing as consciousness of oneself as
a self, that is, as a subject of the experience, a possibility that has been rejected by Jesse Prinz.

This paper is organized in two sections. In the first one I argue in favor of
a weak reading of Hume’s observation. The force of Prinz’s arguments against
some of his opponents, and in favor of a stronger reading, rests on the failure
of his opponents to provide a reductive understanding of what he calls I-qualia.
For this purpose I will offer a such a reductive account in the second section.

This paper was presented at the VII UNAM-UT Austin Meeting.

A presentation of the paper can be found here.

 

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2do Coloquio Internacional de Ciencias Cognitivas

2do Coloquio Internacional de Ciencias Cognitivas

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VII Meeting UNAM-UT Austin

VII Meeting UNAM-UT Austin

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Seminario de Invitados al Posgrado en Filosofía de las Ciencias y del Lenguaje

Seminario de Invitados al Posgrado en Filosofía de las Ciencias y del Lenguaje

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Consciousness In and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience

A great collection of papers edited by Richard Brown. I am glad to have contributed to it. Part X includes the discussion of my paper Not a HOT Dream.

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Phenomenal Consciousness, Cognitive Access and Subjectivity

Phenomenal Consciousness, Cognitive Access and Subjectivity

I have been invited to give a cycle of talks at the UAM

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